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Abstract
This study estimates mean and distributional effects of early between-school ability tracking
on student achievement. For identification, I exploit heterogeneity in tracking regimes between
German federal states. After comprehensive primary school, about 40% of students are selected
for the academic track and taught in separate schools in all states. The remaining students,
however, are either taught comprehensively or further tracked into two different school forms
depending on the state. I estimate the effects of this tracking on students’ mathematics
and reading test scores with a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator to eliminate
unobserved heterogeneity in achievement levels and trends between states. I find substantial
achievement gains from comprehensive versus tracked schooling at ages 10–12. These average
effects are almost entirely driven by low-achievers. I do not find evidence for negative effects
of comprehensive schooling on the achievement of higher performing students. My results
show that decreasing the degree of tracking in early secondary school can reduce inequality
while increasing the efficiency of educational production.
JEL Codes: I24, I28, J24.
Keywords: Tracking, student achievement, inequality, triple differences
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1 Introduction
In the face of decreasing employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, the pressure on ed-
ucation systems to equip students with the necessary skills to succeed in modern labour markets
is growing (European Commission, 2014). Wößmann (2016) demonstrates that national school
systems differ markedly in how well they live up to this task. This raises the question how the
optimal school system should be organised. While the (positive) effect of some institutional
features of school systems on student achievement is relatively well-established by now (e.g.
central exit exams), others remain fiercely debated. One of the most controversial issues in this
regard is the practice of ability tracking. Tracking means grouping students by ability into verti-
cally ordered school tracks. Countries differ widely on the degree to which they track students,
and the age at which students begin to be tracked (Betts, 2011). Some countries, like Finland,
eschew tracking altogether, relying only on comprehensive compulsory schooling. Others, like
Germany, separate students into one of three ranked schools types at an age as early as 10. Be-
tween these two extremes lie countries like the US, which stream students into different tracks
within schools.
The argument behind grouping students by ability is always one of efficiency.1 Proponents
of tracking posit that lower variance classrooms allow for better tailoring of curricula, instruc-
tion speed and pedagogy to students’ abilities and should, therefore, benefit learning for all stu-
dents (Duflo et al., 2010). Critics, in contrast, fear that only high track/ability students benefit
from tracking, whereas students assigned to lower tracks are condemned to lower achievement
compared to a scenario with comprehensive schooling. Indeed, there are many mechanisms
that might make the effects of tracking heterogeneous. First, to the extent that high performing
peers are beneficial to learning (or low performing ones harmful), tracking increases inequal-
ity by construction as it deprives lower track students of more able peers (Sacerdote, 2011).2
Second, there might be motivational consequences of separating students by ability. Lower
track students, knowing they are deemed to be of lower aptitude, might feel discouraged and
reduce their learning efforts. Third, if (financial) resources differ between tracks, students of
certain tracks might be disadvantaged (Betts, 2011). Additionally, even if ability tracking is the-
oretically Pareto efficient, practical implementation is likely to be error-prone as ability is not
directly observable (Brunello et al., 2007). In particular, there might be systematic bias against
particular socio-economic groups, due to biased teacher expectations or selective parental in-
volvement in the placement of their children (van Ewijk, 2010; Jackson, 2013). In addition
to being unfair, both error and bias in track placement would dissipate the claimed benefits
of tracking related to homogeneity of classrooms as school tracks would not actually reflect
1The debate on tracking being a long-standing one, there is a vast social-scientific literature that discusses its
pros and cons. For seminal contributions see e.g. Oakes (1985), Gamoran and Mare (1989) and Slavin (1990).
2Conversely, a reference group of lower ability, implying a higher ordinal rank, might boost students’ academic
self-concept and in turn achievement (e.g. Marsh & Parker, 1984; Murphy & Weinhardt, 2014). This so-called
‘big-fish-little-pond’ effect might partially counteract the positive peer effects referred to here.
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different ability levels.
Given these opposing mechanisms, the effect of tracking on student achievement is theoreti-
cally ambiguous and ultimately an empirical question. If proponents are right and homogeneous
classrooms increase the effectiveness of teaching, tracking should benefit students of all ability
levels. If the hypothesised negative effects along the equity dimension are at work, then tracked
school systems should depress student achievement at the bottom. In that case, tracking might
translate small performance differentials at young ages into substantial inequalities in later life.
These dynamics should be more pronounced the earlier tracking starts, as divergences can ac-
cumulate, and in between-school tracking systems as compared to within-school ones, as the
vertical differentiation between tracks is stronger (Betts, 2011).
Indeed, achievement differences between students of different tracks are large and well-
documented (e.g. Dustmann, 2004) and countries with more rigid tracking systems tend to
exhibit higher levels of educational inequality (Waldinger, 2007). The problem is that such
correlational findings, whether at the individual or the country level, are likely to suffer from
severe endogeneity. Students are not randomly allocated to school tracks but explicitly selected
on ability. Similarly, countries’ educational systems are affected by historical factors that also
directly influence student outcomes. In the face of these selection problems no clear consensus
on the effects of early between-school tracking has emerged in the empirical literature.3 As
both theoretically and empirically it is clear that high-track students have nothing to fear from
tracking – if anything, they gain –, the fundamental question that remains is whether students
assigned to lower tracks in fact lose out from being separated from their higher achieving peers;
and, if so, how large these losses are.
This paper exploits unique within-country between-state variation in tracking practices in
Germany that has emerged as a result of federalism to isolate the effect of early between-school
tracking on student achievement in lower tracks. While primary school is comprehensive ev-
erywhere, the grouping of students in secondary school differs between states. In some states
Germany’s traditional three-tiered between-school tracking system is still in place and the sec-
ondary systems consists of low-, middle- and academic-track schools. Others have transformed
their secondary school system into a two-tiered one by conflating low- and middle-track schools
into one school form. The academic-track school form, called Gymnasium, has been left un-
altered in all states. This means that while in all states about 40% of students transition to
the academic track after comprehensive primary school, depending on the state, the rest of the
student body is either further divided between low- and middle-track schools or taught compre-
hensively for another two years.4
My research design first exploits this variation in tracking in a difference-in-differences
3I provide a detailed review of the literature on the effects of tracking on student outcomes at the end of this
section.
4This refers to all 12 federal states under investigation (out of 16 in total).
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(DD) framework: I estimate how achievement of students in the non-academic tracks develops
differently in the first two years of secondary school depending on whether they are taught com-
prehensively or separated. This strategy controls for time-constant heterogeneity between states
and general achievement trends between grades. Because the DD estimate might still be con-
founded by state-specific achievement trends (i.e. state-grade-specific shocks to achievement)
the differences in achievement growth for non-academic-track students are additionally com-
pared to those for academic-track students for whom there is no difference in tracking between
states (who are thus ‘untreated’ no matter the state). This is implemented via a triple-differences
(DDD) estimator. For the estimation, I use individual-level panel data on mathematical and
reading competence of the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), which allow
me to track students’ progress from before tracking starts until four years after. Hence, I can
also evaluate the persistence of effects through the end of secondary school for low-track stu-
dents. After having thus established the mean effect, the second part of the analysis explores
distributional consequences of tracking. First, I provide non-parametric density estimates of the
impact of tracking on the overall achievement distribution. Second, I explore how the effect of
tracking depends on ability, as measured by students’ position in the pre-tracking achievement
distribution.
I find substantial achievement gains from comprehensive versus tracked schooling in early
secondary school. The effect of comprehensive schooling in grades 5 and 6 on grade 7 achieve-
ment is estimated to be 0.17 standard deviations (SD) in mathematics and 0.21 SD in reading.
These results are invariant to the inclusion of academic-track students as an additional control
group in the DDD model. A battery of robustness checks, such as comparing achievement
trends in primary school, controlling for potential school-level confounders and excluding out-
lier states, further corroborates the validity of my findings. While the average effect of compre-
hensive schooling is clearly positive, it is somewhat imprecisely estimated. The heterogeneity
analysis reveals that it is the lower tail of the initial achievement distribution that drives the
average results. For low-achievers, the effects are precisely estimated, large and persistent.
For high-achievers, in contrast, I find zero effects. Therefore, comprehensive early secondary
schooling has an equalising effect on the distribution of test scores. Importantly, in my setting it
does not trade off efficiency against equity, but enhances both. Auxiliary analyses suggest that
motivational and socio-emotional mechanisms might underlie these effects.
Note that the treatment effect identified in this paper applies to a population of students
that excludes the group of highest achievers in academic-track schools. Hence, one cannot di-
rectly extrapolate from these results to the effects of fully comprehensive school systems. Still,
they prove wrong the premise that there is a monotonously positive relation between class-
room homogeneity and student learning. My results highlight large costs associated with early
between-school tracking for low-achieving students. Accordingly, more dispersed achievement
distributions in more tracked systems do not appear to be a mere artefact of selection and the
3
oft-voiced equity concerns regarding the early tracking of students into different schools seem
warranted.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of between-school tracking, which, in
the face of the severity of the endogeneity issues involved, could only produce tentative evidence
so far. The most credible results stem from two strands of the literature. The first exploits tem-
poral within-country variation in tracking practices induced by de-tracking reforms. An array of
papers analysing reforms in the Nordic countries find achievement gains for students from lower
socio-economic backgrounds and no evidence that de-tracking lowers overall achievement (see
Meghir & Palme, 2005, for Sweden, Aakvik et al., 2010, for Norway and Kerr et al, 2013, for
Finland). Given that these reforms simultaneously changed other features of the school system,
like the minimum school-leaving age, the estimated effects cannot be unequivocally attributed
to changes in tracking, however. Analyses of Britain’s de-tracking reform, which all use the
fact that implementation was staggered across regions, have generated mixed results.5 Pischke
and Manning (2006) argue that this is due to unobserved regional heterogeneity that cannot
sufficiently be controlled for with existing data sets. An arguably cleaner natural experiment,
yet more narrow in scope, is the experience of Northern Ireland, which maintained its tracking
system but increased the share of students admitted to the high track. Interestingly, the find-
ings concerning the top end of the achievement distribution (medium high performers joining
high performers) mirror mine for the bottom end (low performers joining medium performers):
weaker students’ gains from entering higher track environments are large and positive, whereas
losses for the stronger students are small or absent (Guyon et al., 2012).6
Given that de-tracking reforms are rare, a second strand of the literature uses the consider-
able variation in tracking practices between countries. Naturally, this comes at the cost of poten-
tially severe unobserved heterogeneity, which researchers try to circumvent in different ways.
One strategy limits attention to inequality, comparing only family background effects between
tracked and untracked countries. These studies generally find that early between-school tracking
is associated with steeper socio-economic gradients for student achievement (see e.g. Brunello
& Checchi, 2007; Schütz et al., 2008). A second strategy, introduced in a seminal paper by
Hanushek and Wößmann (2006), is based on the observation that primary school is compre-
hensive everywhere while secondary school is either comprehensive or tracked. These studies
use DD to estimate how test scores change differently from elementary to secondary school in
countries with tracked school systems versus those with comprehensive schooling. Most results
indicate that tracking increases inequality in student achievement,7 though Waldinger (2007)
5See Kerckhoff et al. (1996), Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004) and Pischke and Manning (2006).
6Piopiunik (2013) analyses another more narrow tracking reform implemented in the German state of Bavaria.
The Bavarian pre-post differences closely resemble the (contemporaneous) differences in tracking analysed in this
paper. Reassuringly, his findings based on a single state’s reform (the reform-induced increase in tracking caused
achievement losses in the lower tracks and widened the overall achievement distribution) are confirmed in this
study for the whole of Germany.
7Next to Hanushek & Wößmann (2006), see Ammermüller (2013) and Schwerdt & Ruhose (2016).
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argues that these results are sensitive to the way countries are categorised into tracked and un-
tracked ones. This highlights a major problem of the cross-country literature: when assigning
countries to comprehensive or tracked, a range of quite heterogeneous between-school tracking
systems are lumped together and compared to an even more diverse group that includes both
comprehensive and within-school streaming systems. Hence, the treatment (and the counter-
factual) is not clearly defined. Other problems include that also changes in outcomes might be
related to unobserved differences between tracked and untracked countries (Betts, 2011) and
the pooling of incomparable test scores (Contini & Cugnata, 2016).
My study merges the approaches of the within- and the cross-country literatures. I adopt the
logic of Hanushek and Wößmann’s (2006) DD approach in comparing changes in test scores
between elementary and secondary school for the identification of the effect of tracking. Yet,
the fact that I exploit within- instead of cross-country heterogeneity in tracking regimes allows
me to improve on a number of important points. First, apart from differences in tracking, school
systems are strongly harmonised between German states such that the treatment is clearly de-
fined in my case. Therefore, second, the common trends assumption necessary for DD is much
more plausible in my setting than in previous studies. Crucially, I can directly assess its plausi-
bility ex post using academic-track students for whom there is no difference in tracking between
states. Third, I draw on individual-level panel data with test scores that are vertically scaled
across waves.8 Hence, in contrast to previous studies that pooled various achievement tests
with different metrics, my effect sizes are meaningful and can be interpreted cardinally. Fourth,
I am evaluating the impact of tracking along both the efficiency and the equity dimension by
analysing effect heterogeneity and the distributional consequences next to mean effects. This is
key given that the debate on tracking revolves around a perceived efficiency-equity trade-off.
Finally, in seeming contrast to the results presented here, Dustmann et al. (2017) find no
effect of higher track placement on attainment or earnings in the German context. Crucially,
however, their individual-level instrumental variables strategy identifies a local average treat-
ment effect (LATE) of track placement for the group of students at the margin between two
tracks. This effect margin is relevant for understanding the long-term consequences of initial
misallocation of hard-to-assign (i.e. marginal) students to tracks, given an early between-school
tracking system like that of Germany. Yet, if effects of tracking are heterogeneous, this LATE
tells us little about whether tracking is desirable in the first place as it does not apply to the
much larger group of non-marginal students. My results suggest that the zero effect found by
Dustmann et al. (2017) might not be representative of the whole distribution of effects. Using
state-level variation in tracking that shifts more than just marginal students, I find that the sep-
aration of students into different schools at an age as early as 10 depresses achievement for a
sizeable group of low-achievers, thus putting them at a double disadvantage.9
8This means that the test scores are designed to be comparable over time. Achievement at different ages is
measured on the same scale allowing the researcher to compare individual students’ progress over time.
9As Dustmann et al. (2017) study cohorts that started secondary school between 1971 and 1986, another reason
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional background. Section
3 sets out the empirical design. Section 4 describes my data source. Section 5 present the results
and section 6 the robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 discusses implications and concludes.
2 The German School System and Heterogeneity Therein
In Germany, sovereignty over education policy lies with the state governments. In order to en-
sure the comparability of educational standards and degrees, however, the Standing Conference
of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Federal States (Kultusministerkon-
ferenz; KMK) harmonises education policies between states considerably (KMK, 2014). Within
this unique situation of educational federalism, a school system has developed that is fairly ho-
mogeneous across Germany in terms of basic structure, teaching methods and curricula, but
exhibits fine differences within some areas of schooling policy – especially, school structure
and, thus, tracking practices. It is this heterogeneity within a context of general comparability
that I exploit to shed light on the impact of tracking on student achievement.
Throughout Germany, compulsory schooling starts at the age of 6 with primary school,
which generally lasts 4 years and is taught comprehensively with no ability grouping of students
within or between schools.10 Differences between states emerge thereafter (see Figure 1 for a
schematic overview). In West Germany, after fourth grade, i.e. at the age of around 10, students
have traditionally been sorted into one of three vertically ordered school types – Hauptschule,
Realschule and Gymnasium, representing low, middle and high (academic) track – based on
their performance in primary school.11 These tracks lead to different school-leaving certificates
and differ substantially in terms of years of schooling, curriculum, teacher certification and peer
composition. The academic track (i.e. Gymnasium) has the most demanding curriculum, lasts
8 or 9 years and is the only track leading directly to a school-leaving certificate that entitles to
entry into university. This makes for a clear divide between the academic and the non-academic
sector (also in reputation). The middle track (i.e. Realschule) provides general knowledge, lasts
6 years and is supposed to prepare students for advanced vocational and professional education.
If they complete the middle track successfully and meet state-specific requirements they may
upgrade to the academic-track after grade 10. The low track (i.e. Hauptschule) provides a
more applied general education, lasts 5 or 6 years and prepares students for technical vocational
education. Also here, after completion, upgrading to middle-track schools is possible under
specific conditions.
for different findings could be that the effect of tracking changed over time.
10In the two states of Berlin and Brandenburg, primary school lasts 6 years. For this reason, they are not part of
the analysis.
11In all federal states students receive a track recommendation by their teacher based on their performance in
primary school. Whether it is binding depends on the federal state. All results are fully robust to the inclusion
of an indicator variable for binding teacher recommendations (and that indicator variable always turns out to be
insignificant itself).
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Coming from a comprehensive schooling tradition, after reunification the East German
states did not adopt the three-tiered school system one-to-one.12 While taking over the three-
tiered differentiation in school-leaving certificates, they opted for a two-tiered school structure
(Edelstein & Nikolai, 2013). The only difference between the two systems is that there are no
separate low- and middle-track schools, but rather one school form, labelled School with Mul-
tiple Tracks (Schule mit mehreren Bildungsgängen; SMT). Here, all students not attending an
academic-track Gymnasium school are taught together. If a student leaves an SMT school after
5 years (without failing the year, of course) she receives the low degree. If she has the required
grades, she may stay on for another year to earn the intermediate degree. Hence, the difference
between the two systems is one of tracking only.
Due to a number of reforms, there is no longer a geographical divide between a two-tiered
East and a three-tiered West, however. Over time, low-track schools have become increasingly
stigmatised due to falling student numbers and the lack of prospects for its graduates (Helbig &
Nikolai, 2015). Consequently, public pressure grew to reform the traditional three-tiered school
structure in West Germany. This led to several Western states reforming their school system
along the lines of the two-tiered East German system. Just like in the East, the three differ-
ent school-leaving certificates, as well as a distinct academic track consisting of Gymnasium
schools, were retained, but separate low- and middle-track schools were abolished and replaced
with so-called ‘comprehensive schools’ (Gesamtschule). Thus, just like SMT schools in the
East, these schools comprise all non-academic-track students.13
Importantly, neither East German SMT schools nor West German comprehensive schools
specifically assign students to the low or middle track during the first two years of secondary
school (grades 5 and 6) (Leschinsky, 2008). Instead, in these two years, classrooms continue
to be formed disregarding ability or previous performance. It is only from grade 7 onwards
that these schools may group students by ability by forming track-specific classes.14 Note that
the first two years in non-academic-track secondary schools are strongly harmonised: official
information of the KMK (2014) shows that curriculum and learning goals for the non-academic
tracks in grades 5 and 6 focus on the acquisition of a standard set of basic general knowledge
that is virtually indistinguishable between states. Even between low- and middle-track schools
there is no difference in the topics covered, although treatment might be at a slightly higher
level in middle-track schoools.15
12Except for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which did initially adopt the three-tiered system.
13The difference between the East German SMT schools and the West German comprehensive schools is that
in the former only the basic and intermediate degrees can be obtained, while in the latter, mostly, all three degrees
can be earned (Helbig & Nikolai, 2015). In practice, this difference is only relevant in much later grades than those
studied here.
14Schools that use within-school streaming from grade 7 onwards are labelled ‘cooperative’ while those that
continue to teach comprehensively are called ‘integrative’. In most states, it is up to the individual school which
model to implement. To my knowledge there is no information on which model is more prevalent.
15The first two years of secondary school have a special status in the German education system. Labelled
‘orientation stage’ (Orientierungsstufe), grades 5 and 6 formally allow for the possibility to switch between tracks.
In practice, this happens quite rarely (about 5% of students switch according to Bellenberg (2012)). To ensure
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Altogether, these developments mean that in 2010 there were 5 federal states where, after a
four-year comprehensive primary school period, students still entered the traditional three-tiered
secondary school system and 7 federal states where, after a four-year comprehensive primary
school period, students entered a two-tiered secondary school system (see Figure 2 for a map).16
As should have become clear, this dichotomy is relevant only for non-academic-track students:
students sorted into the academic track are separated from their lower-achieving peers after
fourth grade to attend Gymnasium in both regimes. The remaining non-academic-track students,
in contrast, are either further tracked into two different school forms (in states with the three-
tiered regime; henceforth, called the ‘Tracked’ states) or taught comprehensively for at least
another two years (in states with the two-tiered regime; henceforth, called the ‘Comprehensive’
states).17
I conceptualise the two tracking regimes as two treatment conditions. Receiving the treat-
ment of comprehensive instead of tracked schooling may affect achievement through three main
channels. The first one is peer effects, as schools (and classes) will be more heterogeneous
in terms of ability in the Comprehensive than the Tracked states. Tracking proponents claim
that heterogeneity has a negative effect on achievement as teaching is less tailored. Tracking
opponents, in contrast, claim that what really matters is the average ability of one’s peers: high-
ability peers are beneficial and low-ability peers harmful to learning. Second, for students who
would be assigned the low track in the three-tiered system, the treatment increases academic
standards, whereas for students who would be assigned the middle-track standards decrease.
Note that, in practice, the former is the first-order effect because of a strong emphasis on not
putting future middle-track students at a disadvantage by lowering their performance standards
in early secondary school. Low-achievers might either lose out from being held to excessive
academic standards or benefit if they grow with these standards. Third, by attending either a
low- or a middle-track school, students are labelled and explicitly ranked in the Tracked states,
whereas in the Comprehensive states they are not (save for being below the academic track).
This might affect their academic self-concept, motivation and, subsequently, achievement. All
of this holds true for 2 years. Thereafter, within-school tracking commences.
compatibility, the content taught is focused on basic general knowledge and quite harmonised across states and
tracks (e.g. any specialisations only occur after grade 7).
16The analysis excludes 4 of 16 states: Berlin, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern because the track-
ing decision is made after grade 6 instead of after grade 4; Rheinland-Pfalz because the state was transitioning
from a three-tiered to a two-tiered system during the period under investigation and, hence, its treatment status is
ambiguous. While de jure all separate low- and middle-track schools should have been closed by 2010, both the
official statistics and the current data set show some students entering such schools in 2010, indicating that de facto
the fade-out took longer. It seems that these schools were closed in the following years and students re-assigned.
Administrative statistics show that the cohort’s share of students in a low- or middle-track school declined from
8% in 2010 to 6% in 2011 to 3% in 2012. A robustness check where Rheinland-Pfalz is assigned the Tracked states
(as initially there was some tracking) leaves all results unchanged (results available on request).
17For completeness, it should be mentioned that in some of the Tracked states municipalities are allowed to offer
comprehensive schools (IGS), where all three degrees can be eaerned, next to the ordinary schools of three-tiered
system. For the purposes of this paper this can be thought of as non-compliance with regards to the treatment of
comprehensive schooling (see section 4).
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3 Empirical Strategy
The goal of this paper is to identify the effect of between-school tracking on student achieve-
ment. Given the described differences in tracking practices between states in Germany, an intu-
itive empirical strategy is to compare achievement outcomes (of non-academic-track students)
between the Comprehensive and Tracked states. Clearly, however, whether states adopted the
two-tiered instead of the traditional three-tiered tracking regime is not random. Accordingly,
a state’s tracking regime likely correlates with other factors determining student achievement,
such as early childhood education policies or student body composition. As not all of these
factors are known or can be observed by the researcher, simple cross-sectional comparisons
between states, even if they condition on large control sets, are likely to give biased estimates
of the causal effect of tracking on achievement.
To account for such unobserved differences between states, my identification strategy uses
test scores taken at two points in the educational career of students. The first achievement test
is administered right after primary school (at the beginning of grade 5) and the second two
years later (grade 7). In primary school, before the grade 5 test, all students were taught com-
prehensively. Hence, the grade 5 scores can be conceptualised as a ‘pre-treatment’ measure
of achievement, which can be used to control for time-constant achievement differences be-
tween states unrelated to tracking.18 In the two school years between the achievement tests,
those students not attending the academic track are either split between low- and middle-track
schools or taught comprehensively depending on their state of residence. Thus, to isolate the
effect of comprehensive versus tracked schooling on achievement, I compare Comprehensive
and Tracked states merely in terms of the progress (non-academic-track) students make be-
tween grades 5 and 7. Causal interpretation then hinges on the assumption that in the absence
of differences in tracking achievement would have developed in parallel between the two state
groups.
The corresponding difference-in-differences (DD) can be estimated by the following regres-
sion model for the test score Yisg of non-academic-track student i in state s and grade g:
Yisg = θs+λGrade7g+βDDComprsg+uisg, (1)
where θs is a state fixed effect that captures level achievement differences at the end of primary
school between states. Grade7g is a dummy variable for grade 7 scores, such that λ captures
general achievement growth between grade 5 and grade 7. The treatment indicator Comprsg
18This is unless there are anticipation effects of tracking practices in secondary school that affect students’
competence development in primary school (i.e. their grade 5 scores). Such effects might arise if children (or
their parents), knowing that they will be placed in different tracks depending on their performance, already work
harder pre-tracking in (more) tracked regimes. This mechanism could easily introduce non-negligible bias in the
cross-country DD estimates (Eisenkopf, 2007). However, the fact that in both the Tracked and Comprehensive
states the highest-performing children are assigned the academic track dramatically limits its importance in my
setting: highly ambitious students/parents have strong incentives to perform in both systems.
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takes value one for grade 7 observations from the Comprehensive states. Accordingly, the
DD estimate βDD captures how non-academic-track students develop differently when taught
comprehensively compared to being tracked in the first two years of secondary school. Given
the group-level treatment variable, all standard errors are clustered at the state level, allowing
for correlation of errors within states across grades (Bertrand, et al., 2004).19 Comparing the
estimate for βDD with that for λ allows us to benchmark the effect of comprehensive schooling.
The DD model improves on a simple cross-sectional comparison in that it removes differ-
ences in achievement levels between states that would have been observed even in the absence of
differences in tracking practices. Yet, unobserved heterogeneity that would have caused differ-
ential competence growth between the Comprehensive and Tracked states, even in the absence
of differences in tracking, might remain. For example, schooling inputs in grades 5 and 6 could
differ systematically between the two state groups. Econometrically, this would mean that the
error term in equation (1) contains state-grade-specific shocks that correlate with a state’s track-
ing regime: uisg = νsg+eisg and E[Comprsg νsg] 6= 0, such that the OLS estimate of βDD would
be biased.
Importantly, in the current setting we can directly examine whether such correlated shocks
might play a role. As explained in the previous section, the distinction between the Compre-
hensive and Tracked States is only meaningful for students of the non-academic tracks, who in
grades 5 and 6 are either taught comprehensively or further tracked. For academic-track stu-
dents, in contrast, there is no difference between the two regimes, as they enter Gymnasium
schools after grade 4 no matter the state. Under the assumption that the selection into the aca-
demic track does not differ between Tracked and Comprehensive states, they can, therefore, be
used as a control group to correct for potential regime-specific trends in achievement that the
DD model does not pick up.20
The additional control group comparison is easily implemented by the following difference-
in-difference-in-differences (DDD), or triple-differences, model, which is estimated over all
students and hence adds the subscript t for track (academic versus non-academic):
Yistg = νsg+φtg+ψst+βDDDComprstg+ eistg (2)
νsg, φtg and ψst are state-grade, track-grade and state-track fixed effects, respectively. The
treatment indicator Comprstg takes value one for grade 7 observations of non-academic-track
students in the Comprehensive states. The DDD estimate βDDD measures how non-academic-
track students progress differently in the first two years of secondary school depending on the
tracking regime net of state-specific achievement trends as approximated by academic-track
19A robustness check will recalculate standard errors using a wild cluster bootstrap to ensure that inference is
robust to the few clusters problem inherent to my setting.
20The crucial assumption that selection into the academic track is identical between the two state groups is
discussed in further detail and tested below.
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students. If our estimates for βDDD and βDD are roughly identical this indicates that achievement
growth in the academic track is roughly the same between Tracked and Comprehensive states.
This should increase our confidence that there are no state-specific trends confounding the DD
estimate from above and that the assumptions for DD to be interpreted causally hold. If the
two estimates differ, then there appear to be diverging achievement trends between the two
state groups. In that case, the causal interpretation of the DDD estimate would hinge on the
assumption that achievement trends of academic-track students provide an good approximation
of non-academic-track students’ counterfactual achievement trends.
The DD and DDD models estimate the mean effect of comprehensive versus tracked school-
ing. Yet, at the heart of the debate about tracking lie concerns about its distributional conse-
quences and the question regarding winners and losers. Mean effects could easily mask very
heterogeneous effects in the population. In order to answer the question as to how tracking
changes the achievement distribution, we can extend the logic of the DD estimator and, in-
stead of limiting attention to the mean, inspect how the whole achievement distribution changes
differently between Comprehensive and Tracked states from grades 5 to 7.21 Let fCg (Y ) be
the density of non-academic-track students’ grade g test scores (standardised to mean zero and
variance one within grade level g) for the Comprehensive states. The difference fC7 (Y )− fC5 (Y )
measures the change in the density between grades 5 and 7 at each point Y for this group.
f T7 (Y )− f T5 (Y ) is the equivalent difference for the Tracked states. Comparing these two quanti-
ties gives a DD estimator of the effect of comprehensive versus tracked schooling on the density
at each (standardised) test score level Y :
{ fC7 (Y )− fC5 (Y )}−{ f T7 (Y )− f T5 (Y )} (3)
The four densities in this expression are estimated non-parametrically at 100 equally spaced
points forY using a standard Kernel estimator to give a complete picture of how the achievement
distribution changes due to tracking.
Finally, I explore the question of who wins and who loses from tracking by estimating
treatment effect heterogeneities by previous achievement. For this, I exploit the panel nature of
my data, which allows me to rewrite the DD model of equation (1) into ‘gain-score’ or first-
differenced (FD) form:22
∆Yis = Yis7−Yis5 = λ +βDDComprs7+∆uis (4)
21Neumark et al. (2005) proposed this method to estimate the effect of minimum wages on the distribution of
family income.
22Note that repeated cross-sections suffice to estimate the DD model. The panel-based FD estimator and the
repeated cross-sections-based DD estimator are numerically identical in a balanced panel but deviate when there
is attrition (Lechner et al., 2016). In particular, Lechner et al. (2016) show that (under the assumption of constant
treatment effects) DD might be inconsistent while FD remains consistent when panel non-response is non-random.
As there is attrition in my data, comparing the FD and DD estimates serves as a robustness check for potential bias
in the DD estimates stemming from selective panel attrition.
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The FD formulation makes it easy to check if and how the effect of comprehensive schooling
depends on students’ position in the pre-tracking achievement distribution. Specifically, we can
allow βDD to vary by quartile Qq (q= 1, . . . ,4) of the grade 5 test score distribution:23
∆Yis = (λ +κ1)+
4
∑
q=1
1[i ∈ Qq] β qDDComprs7+
4
∑
q=2
1[i ∈ Qq]κq+∆uis (5)
I include a separate intercept κq for each quartile in order to separate treatment effect hetero-
geneity from general heterogeneity in test score growth between different performance groups.24
Clearly, the choice of four groups is arbitrary. Hence, in robustness checks I split the pre-
tracking achievement distribution into different numbers of groups.
4 Data Description
4.1 Analysis Samples
The empirical analysis is based on data from Starting Cohort 3 of the German National Edu-
cational Panel Study (NEPS) (Blossfeld et al., 2011). This survey is a random sample of fifth
graders in Germany in fall 2010, who are followed throughout their school career through annu-
ally conducted waves of surveys and tests. Teacher, principle and parent questionnaires provide
additional background information. Sampling followed a two-stage process, with schools as
primary sampling units.
The analysis is restricted to students with non-missing test scores in regular schools in one
of the 12 states under investigation. While the NEPS is, in principle, a panel data set, repeated
cross-sectional data suffice for estimating the main DD and DDD models defined in equations
(1) and (2). Hence, in order to maximise sample sizes, I do not restrict the estimation sample to
students who are observed repeatedly across grades, but also include students who are observed
only once. This includes students who dropped out of the survey between waves25 and students
who were drawn as part of a large refreshment sample in grade 7 to compensate for attrition26.
The main estimation sample for the DD model, which includes only non-academic-track stu-
dents, comprises 5,019 (student × grade) observations (split roughly equally between grades 5
and 7). This sample is also used for estimating the densities in (3). The main estimation sample
for the DDD model, which adds academic-track students, comprises 9,660 (student × grade)
23Note that this is more flexible than simply interacting the grade 5 score with the comprehensive schooling
indicator. The latter would impose a monotonous and linear relationship between the effect of comprehensive
schooling and ability.
24The first quartile Q1 serves as the baseline category and is absorbed in the overall intercept (λ +κ1).
25Panel attrition between grades 5 and 7 is 16% or 694 students.
26The sampling design of the refreshment sample is roughly identical to that of the main sample. For details
see Steinhauer and Zinn (2016). Inclusion of the refreshment sample adds about 1,600 observations to the grade 7
sample.
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observations. A potential caveat of using the DD estimator with repeated cross-sections instead
of a balanced panel is that the common trend assumption might fail if panel non-response cor-
relates with the treatment (Lechner et al., 2015). Therefore, I corroborate the DD results by
estimating the FD model in (4) with the smaller balanced panel sample (73% of non-academic-
track students tested in grade 5 are tested again in grade 7, leading to a panel of 1,670 students).
The panel sample is also used to estimate effect heterogeneities by previous achievement as
defined in (5).
Most of the analyses limit attention to information on students’ track, state of residence
and their mathematics and reading test scores. These two outcomes are selected for two rea-
sons. First, these are the standard measures in the literature to quantify the effectiveness of
school-based education. Second, achievement tests in these two domains were administered
in the first wave of the study in fall 2010 (i.e. at the beginning of the school year 2010/11),
just as the sampled students entered secondary school. Hence, they can be conceptualised as a
pre-tracking measure of achievement, as required by my identification strategy.27 Thereafter,
students were tested every two years in both domains, such that we have test scores for grades
5, 7 and 9. Grade 7 scores are the main outcome of interest as they measure achievement right
after the two years during which students are exposed to either treatment condition. Grade 9
scores are used to assess persistence in the impact of tracking. Importantly, these test scores are
vertically equated, meaning that achievement is measured on one scale across grade levels.28
Although often overlooked in the economics literature, this is necessary to meaningfully com-
pare achievement growth over time between students (Contini & Cugnata, 2016).29 Scores are
standardised to have zero mean and variance of one across all grades.30 The descriptive statis-
tics in Table 1 show that on average students progress about half a test score standard deviation
per two years of schooling in both maths and reading.
Further, Table 1 shows that about 80% of the sample comes from the Tracked states. This
simply reflects the fact that these states are larger and more populous (see also the map in Figure
2). Other than that, the samples seem reasonably balanced in terms of composition and initial
achievement. The average age at the time of the first test is 10.8 years in both state groups
and about 48% of both samples are female. However, as expected, the Comprehensive states
– composed mostly of the poorer East German states and city states – score slightly worse
on socio-economic variables like household income, parental education and unemployment.
Moreover, the share of students with a migration background is much lower in these states
(17% vs. 27%), mainly reflecting the different migration histories of West and East Germany.
27In fact, students have been in secondary school, and hence the tracking system, for about 3 months at the time
of the test. Note that this biases the estimates of the impact of comprehensive schooling slightly toward zero.
28The psychometric linking of test score scales across grades is achieved through the recurrence of certain anchor
items in every wave of the competence test. For details on the design and linking of NEPS competence tests see
Fischer et al. (2016).
29See Lang (2010) for an elaborate discussion on test score scaling and common pitfalls.
30Merely for the density DD estimator defined in (3), test scores are standardised within grade levels.
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These differences highlight that simple cross-sectional comparisons between the two tracking
regimes are probably not very revealing.
4.2 Selection into the Academic Track
The treatment a student receives depends on her state of residence (Tracked or Comprehensive)
and whether she is assigned the academic track or not. My identification strategy requires that
the selection into the academic track does not differ between the two tracking regimes. Other-
wise, neither the academic-track nor the non-academic-track student bodies would be compa-
rable, invalidating both the DD and the DDD estimator. Administrative records show that 40%
and 43% of the cohort in question attend the academic track in the Tracked and Comprehensive
states, respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). Table 1 reveals that academic-track stu-
dents are slightly oversampled in the NEPS. Reassuringly, however, both in the population and
in my sample, these shares are very close between Comprehensive and Tracked states.
Equal shares leave open the possibility of compositional differences, however. For exam-
ple, it is conceivable that competition for the academic track is stronger when there are only two
tracks, because the alternative school form necessarily comprises all low-achievers. This might
amplify average ability differences between academic and non-academic tracks in two-tiered
versus three-tiered systems. In order to test for the presence of such differences in selection,
Figure 3 plots the pre-tracking (grade 5) test score distributions both overall and for academic
and non-academic-track students separately by tracking regime. In both maths and reading,
the differences between academic- and non-academic-track students are virtually identical in
Tracked and Comprehensive states. This is confirmed by Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests.31 There-
fore, I conclude that there are no differences in the selection into the academic track between
the two state groups and confidently compare their non-academic-track students’ progress while
using academic-track students to control for state-specific achievement trends.32
4.3 Distribution over Non-Academic Tracks
Figure 4 displays the distribution of non-academic-track students over different school forms
by tracking regime. In the Tracked states one third of students attend a low-track school (HS)
and about half attend middle-track schools (RS). In the counterfactual scenario of a two-tiered
31I implement 6 Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests for differences in the test score distributions of non-academic,
academic and all students between Tracked and Comprehensive states for both maths and reading scores. All but
one (academic-track reading; p= 0.07) fail to be rejected at the 10% level.
32The fact that the alternative choice options appear largely irrelevant for the selection into the academic track
might seem puzzling at first. However, it can be explained by the special status that the academic-track Gymnasium
holds in Germany: virtually all ambitious and high-SES students will aspire to the academic track regardless of
what other school forms are present because of its reputation and academic focus (Paulus & Blossfeld, 2007). In
my sample, 78% of students with college-educated parents attend the academic track.
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tracking regime, these two groups would be taught together instead of being separated into
different tracks. Note that a small percentage of students in the Tracked states (14%) attends
comprehensive schools where all three degrees can be obtained and there might or might not
be within-school streaming. In the language of the treatment effects literature, these students
can be thought of as ‘always-takers’ (there are no ‘never-takers’ or ‘defiers’ by construction).
This introduces a slight downward bias in the estimates of the effect of comprehensive versus
tracked schooling on achievement. In the Comprehensive states, there are no low- and middle-
track schools. The vast majority of non-academic-track students in these states (74%) attends
a SMT school. The remaining 26% attend a comprehensive school (IGS).33 As previously
mentioned, there is no within-school streaming in grades 5 and 6 in any of these schools.34 It
is the effect of this comprehensive schooling for non-academic track students in the two-tiered
regime, as compared to the further tracking of this group in the three tiered-regime, that this
paper aims to estimate.
5 Results
5.1 Level Effects of Comprehensive versus Tracked Schooling
This section presents my findings on the average effect of comprehensive, as compared to
tracked, schooling in the first two years of lower secondary school for non-academic-track stu-
dents. Before turning to the estimation results of the DD and DDD models derived above, for
illustrative purposes, I begin by comparing students’ progress between Tracked and Compre-
hensive states graphically. Figure 5 presents kernel density estimates of the distributions of
grade 5 to 7 gain-scores, ∆7Yis = Yis7−Yis5, for academic- and non-academic-track students
in both tracking regimes. The picture is quite striking: whereas in both maths and reading
academic-track students’ progress is very similar between Tracked and Comprehensive states –
if anything, those in the Tracked states learn slightly more – for non-academic-track students
the distribution of gains in the Comprehensive states appears almost monotonically shifted to
the right as compared to that in the Tracked states. These graphs provide strong initial evidence
for the existence of efficiency gains from comprehensive schooling. In the following, I assess
the significance and robustness of this descriptive finding more formally by estimating the DD
and DDD models.
Column (1) of Table 2 displays the regression results for the DD model from equation (1) for
maths (Panel A) and reading (Panel B). This double-differences estimator compares achieve-
33These sample shares are fairly close to the true population shares, which are as follows: 32% HS, 51% RS and
17% IGS in Tracked states; 63% SMT and 37% IGS in Comprehensive states (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016).
34As also previously mentioned, from grade 7 onwards some of these schools form track-specific classes. Un-
fortunately, the NEPS data does not provide information on which model of ability grouping schools follow from
grade 7 onwards.
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ment changes between grades 5 and 7 of non-academic-track students in the Comprehensive
states with the corresponding changes of students in the Tracked states. Through the inclu-
sion of state fixed effects, which absorb pre-tracking differences in achievement levels between
states, the DD model controls for time-constant heterogeneity between states. The coefficient
estimates for the grade 7 dummy imply that during the first two years of secondary school in
the Tracked states students improve by about half a standard deviation (SD) in both subjects. In
the Comprehensive states, students progress about 0.17 SD more in maths and 0.23 SD more in
reading. Hence, these results confirm the finding from the graphical comparison above, suggest-
ing positive effects on achievement from teaching students comprehensively in early secondary
school.
Yet, as explained before, we cannot be sure that controlling for level differences in pre-
tracking achievement between tracking regimes removes all confounding factors that might bias
the comprehensive schooling estimate. Perhaps different student body compositions would have
caused differential achievement growth in Tracked and Comprehensive states also in the ab-
sence of differences in tracking practices. To control for potential state-grade-specific achieve-
ment shocks that would violate the assumption of parallel counterfactual achievement trends,
the DDD model from equation (2) adds academic-track students as an additional control group.
Reassuringly, the triple-differences results, presented in Column (2), are very similar to those
from before: for maths the effect of comprehensive schooling increases marginally to 20%,
while for reading it remains virtually constant. The similarity of the DD and DDD estimates in-
dicates that there are no divergent achievement trends between the Comprehensive and Tracked
states, thus corroborating the causal interpretation of the estimates. Consequently, most analy-
ses in the remainder of the paper restrict attention to the sample of non-academic-track students.
In summary, the results from Table 2 suggest substantial positive effects of comprehensive
schooling on student achievement. In fact, the point estimates translate to 30% higher achieve-
ment growth between grades 5 and 7 in maths and close to 50% in reading. Note, however, that
there is considerable uncertainty around these estimates (see standard errors in Column 1) due
to the relatively small sample sizes in the Comprehensive states. Accordingly, one should exer-
cise some caution in interpreting the point estimates at face value. Nevertheless, the fact that the
coefficients for both subjects are significant and positive strongly rejects tracking proponents’
claim that comprehensive schooling impedes achievement.35 As, by definition, comprehen-
sive systems reduce the homogeneity of classrooms in terms of ability, these findings are at
odds with the notion that there is a monotonously positive relation between classroom homo-
geneity and performance, which would have predicted a negative effect. For this pre-selected
group of non-academic-track students, comprising low achievers and, as is visible from the pre-
tracking achievement distributions displayed in Figure 3, also substantial shares of medium to
high achievers, studying together for an additional two years generates achievement gains.
35The significance of the results also holds when using wild cluster bootstrap instead of cluster-robust standard
errors to calculate significance levels. See section 6.
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5.2 Distributional Consequences
The debate on tracking revolves around questions of equity. Hence, it is crucial to go be-
yond mean effects and explore the distributional consequences of tracked versus comprehen-
sive schooling. To this end, this section describes how the shape of achievement distribution
changed differently between grades 5 and 7 in the Comprehensive versus the Tracked states.
For this exercise, test scores are standardised per grade level to ensure that the distribution of
grade 5 scores is comparable to that of grade 7.
Panel A of Figure 6 presents non-parametric density estimates of non-academic-track stu-
dents’ grade 5 and grade 7 maths scores for the Comprehensive states. Panel B does the same
for the Tracked states. In the Tracked states the distribution appears to have stayed relatively
constant between grade levels, whereas in the Comprehensive states it appears to have tight-
ened slightly. As the differences between the densities are small relative to the scale, Panel
C summarises the information from the upper two panels into one graph by plotting the verti-
cal distance between the grade 5 and 7 densities for the two state groups.36 Thus, these lines
describe how the shape of their maths score distributions changed between grades. The ver-
tical distance between these two lines, displayed in Panel D, is the DD estimate of the effect
of comprehensive versus tracked schooling at each point of the standardised maths score dis-
tribution. A clear picture emerges: comprehensive schooling seems to shift probability mass
from the bottom end of the distribution (approximately from the range [-3, -0.5]) to the mid-
dle part (approximately to the range [-0.5, 1.5]). The picture for reading scores is very similar
(see Appendix Figure A.1). Therefore, next to the positive average effect established before,
comprehensive schooling appears to have an equalising effect on the achievement distribution.
5.3 Effect Heterogeneities
The fact that I find a positive average effect and an equalising effect on the overall achievement
distribution does not tell us who is driving these effects. It might very well be that certain
groups of students lose out from not being tracked, but that these are losses are compensated by
the gains of other groups. Therefore, this section explores treatment effect heterogeneities by
previous achievement and socio-economic status (SES).
The analysis in this section is based on the FD or gain-score model defined in equation (4)
and, hence, on the smaller panel sample (of non-academic-track students). In a balanced panel,
FD is equivalent to DD, but they differ when there is panel attrition as DD also uses students
who are observed only once. Hence, comparing the FD and DD estimates allows us to gauge
the severity of bias in the DD estimates due to non-random panel non-response (Lechner et al.,
2015). Note that this issue should be partially alleviated by the fact that the repeated cross-
36More precisely, the figure plots the difference of the non-parametric maths score density estimates at 100
equally spaced points between the minimum and maximum value of the standardised scores.
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sectional DD sample includes students from the randomly drawn (and, hence, representative)
grade 7 refreshment sample. However, under treatment effect heterogeneity there is a second
order effect. Theory and previous empirical evidence suggest the hypothesis that treatment
effects of comprehensive schooling are larger for low-ability students. If those students are
more likely to drop out between waves, panel-based FD might underestimate the true average
treatment effect. Indeed, attrition is much higher for students in the bottom quartile of the grade
5 achievement distribution (44% compared to 27% for all non-academic-track students) and for
low-track students (in the Tracked states, 42% of low-track students, compared to 29% for all
non-academic-track students, drop out between waves).
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 present the FD estimates for maths and reading, respectively.
Reassuringly, the effect estimates of 0.14 SD (maths) and 0.21 SD (reading) are very close to
the results from above. However, as to be expected under the hypothesised form of treatment
effect heterogeneity together with selective attrition, they are somewhat smaller than the DD
estimates. The following regressions investigate effect heterogeneity by previous achievement
explicitly. In particular, I allow the effect of comprehensive schooling to vary by quartile of
the pre-tracking achievement distribution by interacting the comprehensive schooling indicator
with respective dummies as demonstrated in equation (5). To the extent that grade 5 achieve-
ment captures ability, the achievement quartiles can be thought of as representing ability groups.
The results in columns (2) and (5) reveal a steep gradient in the effect of comprehensive
schooling with respect to previous achievement. This is most pronounced for maths where the
effect is strictly decreasing with previous achievement. The estimate of 0.3 SD for the lowest
group is more than double the size of the average effect. For the middle two groups the effects
are positive but insignificant (the point estimates are 0.12 and 0.1 SD, respectively), whereas
for the the highest group we get a fairly precise zero. Large and significant coefficients of
0.27 SD for the low and 0.19 SD for the mid-low groups indicate that also in reading low-
achieving students benefit from comprehensive schooling. Here, the gradient is somewhat less
pronounced, given that the point estimates also remain positive for the upper two groups. These
are, however, imprecisely estimated and insignificantly different from zero.
These results imply that it is low achievers – and, to the extent that grade 5 achievement
measures ability, low-ability students – who drive the positive level effects found before. They
seem to benefit immensely from studying together with their higher achieving peers in a more
demanding scholastic environment for another two years. Importantly, we do not find a negative
effect for any of the achievement groups, meaning that higher achievers do not seem to lose out
from learning together with their lower achieving peers.37
Lastly, given that much research on tracking focuses on socio-economic inequalities, columns
(3) and (6) check for effect heterogeneity by SES. The dummy variable ‘Low SES’ indicates that
37These results are confirmed when investigating effect heterogeneity by terciles (instead of quartiles) of the
grade 5 achievement distribution (see Appendix Table A.1).
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a student reported having less than the median number of books at home (for the non-academic-
track sample).38 It is interacted with the comprehensive schooling indicator (and added to the
regression) analogously to the previous achievement dummies before. The results reported in
columns (3) and (6) show little interaction between the effect of tracking and students’ socio-
economic background. This is at odds with previous studies that find that especially low-SES
students benefit from comprehensive schooling (e.g. Kerr et al., 2013). My result is likely ex-
plained by the fact that non-academic-track students are a negatively pre-selected group, where
SES differences are not very pronounced to begin with. For instance, in my sample, only 22%
of students with college-educated parents even attend a non-academic-track school. The socio-
economic dividing line runs more between the academic- and the non-academic tracks, rather
than between different school forms of the non-academic segment. Accordingly, the first-order
effect of the treatment of comprehensive schooling in my setting is the mingling of students of
different abilities rather than of different socio-economic backgrounds. In turn, it is unsurpris-
ing that SES-inequalities are not significantly affected by comprehensive schooling.
5.4 Persistence of Effects
This section presents the results for grade 9 outcomes – the grade level after which students
can leave school with a low-track degree (conditional on obtaining the required grades). Re-
member that many SMT and comprehensive schools in the Comprehensive states start using
within-school streaming starting from grade 7 onwards. Hence, differences in tracking between
the two state groups diminish from that grade level onwards. The comparability of school sys-
tems between states decreases more generally with grade level as schooling policies are less
harmonised for higher grades (KMK, 2014). Accordingly, the purpose of this section is mainly
to obtain a rough idea of the persistence of effects, while acknowledging that effect estimates
might be contaminated by other factors.
Table 4 presents the results for the FD model for grade 5 to 9 gain-scores, ∆9Yis =Yis9−Yis5,
in analogous fashion to Table 3. Due to panel attrition, the sample sizes are substantially smaller
than before, which reduces precision in the estimates. The average effects displayed in columns
(1) and (4) continue to show an advantage for those students taught comprehensively in grades 5
and 6, but they lose their significance. Point estimates are about half the size than those for grade
7, indicating gradual fade-out of the large average short-run effects.39 However, inspection of
38Many background variables from the parent questionnaire measure SES more directly than the student reported
number of books at home. However, all of these variables have a high portions of missing values (about 25%). To
avoid reducing the sample size any further, I refer to this variable from the student questionnaire to proxy for SES.
The conclusions are the same when using other SES proxies in smaller samples. Results for these regressions are
available on request.
39The differences between grade 7 and grade 9 results are not driven by sample differences. Using the smaller
grade 9 sample for the grade 7 regressions reproduces the previous results quite precisely. Using the larger cross-
sectional sample and estimating the grade 9 level effects by DD confirms the fade-out of mean differences. As
results between DD and FD do not differ, the DD results are omitted for brevity.
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columns (2) and (5) reveals that the small and insignificant average effects mask large and
persistent effects of comprehensive schooling for the lower ability groups. Again, this is most
clear for maths where the very large short-run effect for the bottom achievement group is now
halved to 0.16 SD, but remains highly significant – both statistically and economically. The
coefficient for the mid-low group is positive but insignificant and the coefficients for the upper
half of the ability distribution are very imprecisely estimated but closer to zero. Similarly, for
reading we find two sizeable positive coefficients (one of which is significant) in the bottom
half and insignificant coefficients close to zero for the top half of the achievement distribution.
The SES interactions in columns (3) and (6) remain insignificant.
5.5 Mechanisms
The effect of tracking, or conversely comprehensive schooling, on achievement might operate
through various channels. As explained above, the three most important channels in this con-
text are peer effects, academic standards and motivational consequences. I cannot discriminate
between these with the data at hand and all three are likely to play a role. Nevertheless, re-
garding peer effects, the results indicate that classroom heterogeneity might be less important
than commonly assumed; otherwise a positive effect of comprehensive schooling could not be
explained. The fact that benefits for low-achievers are large while high-achievers are unaffected
by comprehensive schooling suggests non-linear peer effects: contact with higher achieving
peers appears more beneficial than contact with lower achieving ones harmful. Given that cur-
ricular differences between low- and middle-track schools are relatively small in the first two
grades of secondary school, it is unlikely that academic standards are the primary driver behind
the results. However, the negative image of low-track schools in Germany might both dis-
courage students assigned to these schools and negatively influence teacher expectations about
their potential. Such stigma, negatively selected peers and slightly less demanding standards
might present a serious mix of obstacles to achievement that explains the large advantage of
low-achievers in the Comprehensive states.
These dynamics should find expression in differences in socio-emotional outcomes between
Tracked and Comprehensive states. To explore these issues Table 5 presents evidence on dif-
ferences in students’ educational aspirations, their school-related motivation and feelings of
helplessness in school. Educational aspirations were measured in grades 5 and 7, allowing for
implementation of the difference-in-differences design. Given the categorical nature of this
variable, I construct a dummy that indicates that a student aspires higher than the low-track
school-leaving certificate. Column (1) indicates that in the Tracked states the share of students
aspiring higher decreases by about 2 percentage points between grades, whereas in the Com-
prehensive states it increases by roughly 6 percentage points. Indeed, comprehensive schooling
reduces the share of students with low educational aspirations. The other variables are measured
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in grade 7 only. Consequently, for these outcomes I revert to OLS regressions and large con-
trol sets to approximate the effect of comprehensive schooling.40 Accordingly, I cannot fully
rule out that the estimates are confounded by differences between states unrelated to tracking.
With these caveats in mind and despite their limited significance, the results in columns (2) to
(5) seem to suggest that the positive effect of comprehensive schooling on cognitive outcomes
goes hand in hand with improved socio-emotional outcomes: students taught comprehensively
are less helpless (at least in maths) and more motivated (at least in German). Although far
from conclusive, these results are consistent with motivational consequences of tracking being
important.
6 Robustness Checks
This section probes the robustness of my results by performing an array of additional tests.
In particular, I consider (i) potential threats to identification and (ii) potential problems for
inference.
6.1 Threats to Identification
The difference-in-differences model controls for (unobserved) factors influencing student achieve-
ment that have become manifest before the start of secondary school. Thus, it eliminates all
time-constant between-state achievement differences. Consequently, causal interpretation of
the comprehensive schooling effect relies on the assumption that, in the absence of differences
in tracking, grade 5 to 7 achievement growth of non-academic-track students would have been
the same in Tracked and Comprehensive states. Evidence favouring of the plausibility of this
assumption has been presented in form of the triple-differences model, which confirms that, in
the academic track, achievement growth is indeed parallel. Though reassuring, we do not have
certainty that these parallel trends carry over to the non-academic tracks.
A further natural test of this assumption is to compare ‘pre-treatment’ achievement trends
between Comprehensive and Tracked states. These are the trends in primary school, before
tracking has started. Unfortunately, the NEPS Starting Cohort 3 panel, used for the analysis
so far, commenced in fifth grade, meaning that we have no information on these students’
achievement growth in primary school. Hence, I revert to data from NEPS Starting Cohort
2, which is a random sample of first graders in 2013 followed throughout primary school.41
Given that there were no major changes to primary education in Germany in this time period,
the achievement trends of this cohort should be roughly similar to those of the cohort used
40Control variables include: student age, sex, migration background, number of siblings, parental years of
education, household income, unemployment and single parent household. In order to retain the full sample, I add
missing dummies for each control variable and replace missing values with variable means.
41The cohort of the main sample attended first grade in the school year 2006/07.
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in the main analysis. With the primary school sample, I estimate the DD model defined in
equation (1) using grade 2 and grade 4 maths scores (instead of grade 5 and 7 scores) to test if
divergent achievement trends can already be detected in the two years prior to tracking.42 Table
5 presents the estimation results. Reassuringly, the coefficient on the interaction between the
Comprehensive state dummy and the grade 4 dummy is very close to zero, indicating parallel
pre-treatment trends between Tracked and Comprehensive states.
Parallel trends in primary school and the academic track do not rule out the possibility of co-
treatments. Perhaps home and school inputs received by non-academic-track students in the first
two years of secondary school differ systematically between the two regimes. If so, these could
be the real reason behind divergent achievement growth. We know that there are socio-economic
differences between states and perhaps there are SES differences in parental investment into
their children in grades 5 and 6. Further, even though curricula in lower secondary school
are harmonised between states, it is conceivable that SMT and comprehensive schools differ
systematically from low- and middle-track schools in terms of the school inputs they provide.
In order to test for such potential confounders, I draw on ample background data provided
in the NEPS. In particular, I cumulatively add (i) basic individual controls from the student
questionnaire (age, sex, migration background, number of siblings), (ii) SES controls from the
parent questionnaire (parental years of education, household income, unemployment, single
parent household) and (iii) class-level controls from the teacher and principal questionnaires
(teacher experience, teacher further education, class size) to the FD model defined in equation
(4).43 If the results are really being driven by systematically different home or schooling inputs
between Tracked and Comprehensive states then the estimated effect of comprehensive school-
ing should drop upon the inclusion of these controls. Tables 6 shows the results for maths (Panel
A) and reading (Panel B). The row with values for the R2 indicates that these variables add ex-
planatory power to the model. Nevertheless, in both subjects the effect estimate remains almost
completely stable throughout all four specifications. As any other home or schooling inputs that
are not included here will most certainly correlate with those I do observe, the fact that there is
no substantial drop in the effect estimates is strong evidence for the robustness of my results.
6.2 Threats to Inference
It is well known that clustered data can cause problems for inference whenever there is intra-
cluster correlation of errors and/or independent variables (MacKinnon & Webb, 2017). My
data has a clear group-level structure: students are nested in classrooms, which are nested in
schools, which are nested in states. The primary sampling unit of the NEPS is the school.
Hence, for correct inference the correlation between errors of students of the same school is the
42The DD model cannot be estimated for reading scores as these are only available for grade 4.
43To not reduce the sample size I add missing dummies for each control variable and replace missing values
with variable means.
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minimum that needs to be taken into account in the calculation of standard errors. As treatment
assignment depends on the state (and its interaction with track), I followed standard practice for
conservative inference and clustered standard errors at the state level in all analyses, allowing
for arbitrary within-state across-grade dependence of errors (Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron &
Miller, 2015).
However, the asymptotics of the standard cluster robust variance estimator (CRVE) are
based on the number of clusters going to infinity while my analyses only include 12 states.
Finite sample distributions might only poorly approximate asymptotic ones if the number of
clusters is small. On top of this, states differ widely in size meaning that, potentially problemat-
ically, clusters are also quite heterogeneous in my case (see e.g. Carter, Schnepel & Steigerwald,
2017). Hence, in order to ensure that the confidence of my results has not been overstated de-
spite clustering at the state level, Table 6 compares CRVE- with wild cluster bootstrap-based
p-values for the DD and DDD models for maths and reading (Cameron et al., 2008).44 Both
methods lead to very similar results, indicating that inference is robust.
Lastly, I address the concern that my results are driven by particular outlier states, whose
performance diverged extremely from the others, instead of reflecting a causal effect of compre-
hensive schooling. To this end, I perform a simple leave-one-out analysis, dropping one state
at a time and re-estimating the DD and DDD models. Figure 7 plots the accordant distribu-
tion of the point estimates for the effect of comprehensive schooling with confidence intervals.
The significance of the results is slightly affected when some larger states are dropped but, in
general, the main effects are robust to the exclusion of any particular state.45
7 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper set out to estimate the effect of early between-school tracking in secondary school
on student achievement – an issue that, despite its enduring prevalence in educational policy
debates, is still not fully understood. Theoretically, the question of tracked versus comprehen-
sive schooling seems to involve a trade-off between countervailing forces. On the one hand,
homogeneous learning environments are likely to facilitate skill and knowledge acquisition as
content and teaching style can be more closely tailored to median classroom ability. On the
other hand, the concentration of high ability students in certain schools might impair compe-
tence development of students in lower tracks through negative motivational consequences and
44The wild cluster bootstrap proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) permutes the outcome variable based on ‘re-
stricted’ residuals (i.e. those stemming from coefficient estimates that impose the null hypothesis to be tested)
and weights from a Rademacher distribution. Webb (2014) shows that with 12 or less clusters, a specific six-point
distribution is preferable over the Rademacher distribution. Hence, I implement the latter. However, results do not
substantially differ between the standard (Cameron et al., 2008), an unrestricted (MacKinnon & Webb, 2017) or a
schools-as-‘sub-clusters’-of-states (MacKinnon & Webb, 2016) version of the bootstrap.
45Due to data confidentiality the names of the federal states cannot be revealed.
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peer effects. Moreover, potential error and bias in track placement could attenuate theoretical
positive effects of tracking in practice. Identifying these effects is notoriously difficult due to
the severity of the selection problems involved.
I circumvent such issues of endogeneity by exploiting differences in tracking between Ger-
man federal states. In all states, about 40% of students transition to the academic track after
comprehensive primary school. Depending on the state, however, the remaining student body
is either divided between low- and middle-track schools or taught comprehensively for another
two years. I estimate the effects of these two years of comprehensive instead of tracked school-
ing on achievement in a difference-in-difference-in-differences framework. The estimator com-
pares achievement growth of comprehensively taught non-academic-track students with that of
tracked ones, while controlling for tracking-regime-specific trends using unaffected students in
the academic track.
The effect of comprehensive versus tracked schooling in grades 5 and 6 is estimated to be
0.17 SD in mathematics and 0.23 SD in reading. While there is some non-negligible uncertainty
around these average effects they are clearly non-negative. The heterogeneity analysis reveals
that it is the lower tail of initial achievement distribution that drives these average effects. For
them the effects are precisely estimated and large. Large effects for low-achievers and zero
effects for high-achievers suggest a pronounced ability gradient in the effect of comprehensive
schooling. It has an equalising effect on the distribution of test scores without trading off effi-
ciency against equity. The effects for the bottom-end are persistent: even though many schools
use within-school streaming from grade 7 onwards, in grade 9 – towards the end of secondary
school for those that leave school with the lowest degree – these students are still considerably
better off. Auxiliary analyses suggest that students’ school-related motivation and educational
aspirations are higher in the comprehensive system.
The fact that for low-achievers the disadvantage from early tracking is large and persistent
is likely due to the fact that this group concentrates in low-track schools, which, following
the negative selection, become environments of low standards, expectations, motivation and
performance. Unsurprisingly, in Germany, these schools have become increasingly stigmatised.
If, instead, these students are integrated into schools with higher achieving peers and exposed
to higher scholastic demands, their achievement improves substantially without impairing that
of their peers. Accordingly, the reforms of several West German states to abolish low-track
schools and establish two-tiered school systems should be applauded from an efficiency and an
equity standpoint.
The German school system being exemplary for the early between-school tracking systems
that are found across Europe (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands) (Bol
& van de Werfhorst, 2013), these results carry direct relevance beyond the German context.
Globally, many governments seek to reduce the share of low achieving school-leavers that their
school systems produce. My results highlight that vertical differentiation, especially at such
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early ages, impedes on this goal as it depresses performance at the bottom.
Nevertheless, one should be careful with extrapolating from these results to the effects of
fully comprehensive school systems as the variation in tracking practices I exploit only con-
cerns a negatively preselected group of students. We can only speculate about the effects of
comprehensive schooling would be for the best students on academic-track schools. The fact
that I find a negative ability gradient suggests that the effect could eventually turn negative – es-
pecially as students become older. There is natural appeal to the idea of creating homogeneous
classrooms through some form of tracking at one point of secondary schooling. However, the
fact that even for the best 25% of non-academic-track students – who would be medium-high
achievers even in academic-track schools (see Figure 3) – I do not find negative effects suggests
that the costs to classroom heterogeneity might be smaller than commonly assumed. The evi-
dence presented in this paper, therefore, highlights that homogeneity in terms of ability is only
part of the story. Peer effects, motivational consequences of tracking and curricular demands
are also important determinants of student achievement; otherwise these findings could not be
explained. Accordingly, policy-makers need to carefully balance these forces when determining
the degree of vertical differentiation in their school systems and the age at which differentiation
starts.
Finally, note that the literature on within-school streaming mostly finds positive effects for
students selected for high-ability classrooms without negative effects for those in regular class-
rooms (e.g. Card & Giuliano, 2016; Duflo et al., 2011; Figlio & Page, 2002). Rather than con-
tradicting my and previous findings on between-school tracking, this suggests that the costs to
tracking increase convexly with the degree of vertical differentiation between tracks. It makes
intuitive sense that mechanisms like peer effects, motivational factors and academic expecta-
tions are more pronounced when students are separated between schools. Combining these
insights about the interplay between the grouping of students and educational production sug-
gests that forming (subject-specific) classrooms based on ability from a certain age onwards,
but eschewing vertical differentiation between schools to avoid creating detrimental learning
environments for low-track students, might allow policy-makers to reap efficiency gains from
homogeneity without incurring large costs in terms of equity.
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of the two tracking regimes in Germany.
Notes: For illustrative purposes the figure abstracts from the fact that in some of the three-tiered
Tracked states there are some comprehensive schools (see text and Figure 4 for details). Academic
track = Gymnasium, Intermediate track = Realschule, Low track = Hauptschule, School with mul-
tiple tracks (SMT) = Schule mit mehreren Bildungsgängen, Comprehensive schools = Integrierte
Gesamtschule
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Figure 2: German federal states coloured by tracking regime.
Notes: Comprehensive states = light grey. Tracked states = black. States excluded from the
analysis = white.
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Figure 3: Pre-tracking (grade 5) distribution of test scores by track and tracking regime.
Notes: Comprehensive states = grey lines. Tracked states = black lines. Densities are
estimated based on the panel sample using a Epanechnikov kernel estimator with optimal
bandwidth (for normally distributed variables) (Silverman, 1986).
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Figure 4: Grade 5 distribution of non-academic-track students over different school forms
by tracking regime.
Notes: HS = low-track school (Hauptschule), RS = intermediate-track school (Realschule),
SMT = school with multiple tracks (Schule mit mehreren Bildungsgängen), IGS = compre-
hensive school (Integrierte Gesamtschule)
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Figure 5: Distribution of gain-scores, ∆7Yis = Yis7−Yis5, by track and tracking regime.
Notes: Densities are estimated based on the panel sample using a Epanechnikov kernel
estimator with optimal bandwidth (for normally distributed variables) (Silverman, 1986).
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Figure 6: Changes in maths score distribution through comprehensive schooling vs. track-
ing.
Notes: The densities in Panel A and B are based on the cross-sectional grade 5 and grade
7 samples with within-grade standardised maths scores. Estimation uses a Epanechnikov
kernel estimator with optimal bandwidth (for normally distributed variables) (Silverman,
1986). For Panel C, I calculate the difference between the non-parametric density estimates
of the grade 7 and grade 5 scores at 100 equally spaced points between the minimum and
maximum of the standardised maths score for Tracked and Comprehensive states. Panel D
plots the difference in these differences.
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Figure 7: Robustness check IV: Leave-one-state-out DD and DDD estimates.
Notes: The figure presents point estimates including 95%-confidence intervals (based on
clustered standard errors) for the effect of comprehensive schooling for maths (Panel A)
and reading scores (Panel B) when dropping one state at a time.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Tracking Regime
Tracked
States
Comprehensive
States
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Grade 5 cross-section
Mathematics score -0.59 (0.85) -0.53 (0.88)
Reading score -0.50 (0.92) -0.44 (0.88)
Academic track∗ 0.48 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
Female∗ 0.47 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
Age in fifth grade 10.79 (0.53) 10.80 (0.66)
Migration background∗ 0.27 (0.44) 0.17 (0.37)
Nr. of siblings 1.14 (0.96) 0.95 (0.86)
Single parent∗ 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28)
Unemployment∗ 0.10 (0.30) 0.14 (0.35)
Parental education (years) 14.53 (2.40) 14.49 (2.18)
Household income (1,000) 3.79 (2.32) 3.46 (1.54)
N 3704 679
Grade 7 cross-section
Mathematics score 0.00 (0.93) 0.06 (0.83)
Reading score 0.05 (1.01) 0.18 (0.91)
Academic track∗ 0.48 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50)
N 4255 1034
Grade 9 cross-section
Mathematics score 0.61 (0.90) 0.56 (0.83)
Reading score 0.48 (0.83) 0.47 (0.81)
Academic track∗ 0.48 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50)
N 3307 850
Notes: Stars ∗ indicate binary variables. Number of observations are based
on the number of of non-missing test scores for each grade level.
37
Table 2: DD and DDD estimates of comprehensive schooling effect on grade 7 outcomes
Model specification: Double Differences Triple Differences
(1) (2)
Panel A: Mathematics
Comprehensive 0.174∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗
schooling (0.043) (0.086)
Grade 7 0.535∗∗∗
(0.013)
Panel B: Reading
Comprehensive 0.229∗∗ 0.239∗
schooling (0.085) (0.126)
Grade 7 0.470∗∗∗
(0.037)
State FE X
State×grade FE X
State×track FE X
Track×grade FE X
Obs. (students×grade) 5014 9660
Notes: Column (1) presents OLS estimates for the DD model defined in equation
(1) with either grade 5 and 7 mathematics scores as the dependent variable (Panel
A) or grade 5 and 7 reading scores (Panel B). The sample includes all students
on regular non-academic-track schools with non-missing test scores. Column (2)
presents OLS estimates of the DDD model defined in equation (2). All academic-
track students with non-missing test scores are added to the sample. Clustered
standard errors (at the federal state level) are reported in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance levels: ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table 3: Effect heterogeneity by previous achievement and SES for grade 7 outcomes
Dependent variable: ∆7 Mathematics ∆7 Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Comprehensive 0.135∗∗ 0.079 0.210∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
schooling (0.048) (0.046) (0.060) (0.088)
× Low 0.304∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.078)
×Mid-lower 0.121 0.189∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.057)
×Mid-upper 0.101 0.149
(0.096) (0.115)
× High -0.021 0.197
(0.051) (0.114)
× Low SES 0.098 -0.000
(0.069) (0.101)
Obs. (students) 1670 1670 1659 1670 1670 1659
Notes: All regressions are based on the panel sample of non-academic-track students who have non-
missing grade 5 and grade 7 test scores. Columns (1) and (4) present OLS estimates for the FD model
of equation (4) for mathematics and reading grade 5-to-7 gain-scores, respectively. Columns (2) and
(5) present results from OLS estimation of the FD model of equation (5), which interacts the treatment
variable with dummies for each quartile of the grade 5 test score distribution (and adds these dummies as
separate regressors). The model underlying columns (3) and (6) interacts the treatment with a dummy
variable for reporting less than the median number of books at home. Clustered standard errors (at
the federal state level) are reported in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table 4: Persistence of effects until grade 9
Dependent variable: ∆9 Mathematics ∆9 Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Comprehensive 0.088 0.126∗ 0.101 0.096
schooling (0.066) (0.067) (0.082) (0.084)
× Low 0.156∗∗∗ 0.134
(0.044) (0.158)
×Mid-low 0.193 0.183∗∗
(0.122) (0.065)
×Mid-high -0.129 0.036
(0.168) (0.110)
× High 0.090 0.083
(0.104) (0.128)
× Low SES -0.071 0.017
(0.078) (0.102)
Obs. (students) 1282 1282 1281 1246 1246 1242
Notes: All regressions are based on the panel sample of non-academic-track students who have non-
missing grade 5 and grade 9 test scores. Regressions for grade 9 gain-scores are analogous to those
for grade 7 reported in Table 2. Clustered standard errors (at the federal state level) are reported in
parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
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Table 5: Inspecting potential socio-emotional mechanisms
Model specification: Double Diff. Cross-sectional OLS
Dependent variable: Aspirations (dummy) Helplessness (scale) Motivation (scale)
> low certificate Maths German Maths German
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Comprehensive 0.080∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.076 0.144 0.137∗
schooling (0.041) (0.050) (0.049) (0.092) (0.073)
Grade 7 -0.023∗∗
(0.009)
Constant 1.195∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗ 2.195∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗
(0.336) (0.288) (0.507) (0.163)
State FE X
Basic & SES controls X X X X
Observations (students×grade) (students) (students) (students) (students)
5021 2511 2523 2339 2322
Notes: Column (1) reports OLS estimates for the DD model of equation (1) with as dependent variable an indicator
variable equal to unity when the student reports higher realistic educational aspirations than the low-track school-
leaving certificate. The sample includes all grade 5 and grade 7 observations with non-missing values for the aspi-
rations variable. The remaining columns are based on grade 7 cross-sectional samples, in each regression including
all students with non-missing values for the dependent variable. These OLS regressions control for the following co-
variates: student age, sex, migration background, number of siblings, parental years of education, household income,
unemployment and single parent household, with missing values in each of them replaced with variable means and
the respective missing dummies added. Helplessness ranges from 1 to 4, with larger values indicating a higher degree
of feeling of helplessness in the respective school subject. The variable averages 5 survey items, each measured on a
4-point Likert scale. Motivation ranges from 1 to 4, with larger values indicating a higher intrinsic motivation for the
respective school subject. The variable averages 4 survey items, each measured on a 4-point Likert scale. Clustered
standard errors (at the federal state level) are reported in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
41
Table 6: Robustness check I: Common trends in primary school
Dependent variable: Mathematics
(1)
Compr. state -0.013
× Grade 4 (0.033)
Grade 4 1.361∗∗∗
(0.029)
State FE X
Obs. (students×grade) 11190
Notes: In contrast to all other results, these re-
sults are based on the primary school sample of
the NEPS (Starting Cohort 2). The table presents
OLS estimates for the DD model of equation
(1) for grade 2 and 4 mathematics scores. The
sample includes all students on regular primary
schools with non-missing test scores. Clustered
standard errors (at the federal state level) are re-
ported in parentheses. Stars indicate significance
levels: ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
42
Table 7: Robustness check II: Potential confounding through home and school inputs
Specification: Baseline
+ basic
controls
+ SES
controls
+ class-level
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dependent variable: ∆7 Mathematics
Comprehensive 0.135∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.143∗∗
schooling (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.063)
R2 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.020
Panel B: Dependent variable: ∆7 Reading
Comprehensive 0.210∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
schooling (0.060) (0.051) (0.049) (0.039)
R2 0.008 0.017 0.019 0.024
Obs. (students) 1670 1670 1670 1670
Notes: All regressions are based on the panel sample of non-academic-track
students who have non-missing grade 5 and grade 7 test scores. Panel A presents
the estimation results for grade 5-to-7 gain-scores in mathematics and Panel B
those for reading. Columns (2) to (4) gradually add the following covariates to
the baseline FD model of equation (4), whose results are presented in column (1):
basic individual controls (age, sex, migration background, number of siblings),
SES controls (parental years of education, household income, unemployment,
single parent household) and class-level controls (teacher experience, teacher
further education, class size). Missing dummies are added as before (see notes
of Table 5). Clustered standard errors (at the federal state level) are reported
in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< 0.01.
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Table 8: Robustness Check III: Inference using wild cluster bootstrap
p-value
Coefficient
Cluster-robust
variance estimate
Wild cluster
bootstrap
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Mathematics
DD 0.174 [0.002] [0.006]
DDD 0.205 [0.037] [0.024]
Panel B: Reading
DD 0.230 [0.020] [0.030]
DDD 0.239 [0.084] [0.078]
Notes: Column (1) presents OLS estimates of the effect of compre-
hensive schooling for the DD model of equation (1) (using only the
non-academic-track sample) and the DDD model of equation (2) (using
all students). Column (2) displays p-values based on the conventional
cluster-robust variance estimator (CRVE) and a t(G− 1) distribution
(where G is the number of clusters). Column (3) displays p-values
based on the (restricted) wild cluster bootstrap. Bootstraps estimates
are based on 999 replication and weights from Webb’s (2014) six-point
distribution for the case of few clusters.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Changes in reading score distribution through comprehensive schooling vs.
tracking.
Notes: The densities in Panel A and B are based on the cross-sectional grade 5 and grade
7 samples with within-grade standardised reading scores. Estimation uses a Epanechnikov
kernel estimator with optimal bandwidth (for normally distributed variables) (Silverman,
1986). For Panel C, I calculate the difference between the non-parametric density estimates
of the grade 7 and grade 5 scores at 100 equally spaced points between the minimum and
maximum of the standardised reading score for Tracked and Comprehensive states. Panel
D plots the difference in these differences.
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Table A.1: Effect heterogeneity by previous achievement tercile for grade 7 outcomes
Dependent variable: ∆7 Mathematics ∆7 Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Comprehensive 0.135∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
schooling (0.048) (0.060)
× Bottom 0.277∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.070)
×Mid 0.090 0.119
(0.085) (0.076)
× Top 0.030 0.227∗∗
(0.052) (0.076)
Obs. (students) 1670 1670 1670 1670
Notes: All regressions are based on the panel sample of non-academic-track
students who have non-missing grade 5 and grade 7 test scores. Columns (1)
and (3) present OLS estimates for the FD model of equation (4) for mathematics
and reading grade 5-to-7 gain-scores, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) present
results from OLS estimation of the interacted FD model like in equation (5)
but with dummies for each tercile, instead of quartile, of the grade 5 test score
distribution. Clustered standard errors (at the federal state level) are reported
in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< 0.01.
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